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Closure of “A Unified Approach to Transient Stability
Contingency Filtering, Ranking, and Assessment”
D. Ernst, D. Ruiz-Vega, M. Pavella, P. Hirsch, and D. Sobajic
We are indebted to Professor S. Rovnyak for his appreciation and
thoughtful comments. The questions raised in his discussion give us
the opportunity to clarify some key issues of the FILTRA technique
and, more generally, to elaborate further on the SIME method and its
two-faceted approach to transient stability assessment and control. In
the following we consider his questions in the same order as they appear
in the discussion.
The first three questions refer to the filtering task of FILTRA,
achieved by Block 1 in Fig. 1 of the paper.
1) We agree that it might be beneficial to sacrifice reliability for
the sake of computational efficiency, especially since, as you correctly
observe, many uncertainties may exist about the system parameters and
modeling, the system state, and the very definition of the contingencies.
Note, however, that some of these uncertainties fade as the system gets
closer to real-time operation. Remember also that SIME does not in-
troduce any additional uncertainties with respect to the time-domain
program that it drives; of course, a good statistical approach could be
more appropriate for handling uncertainties.
More generally, the tradeoff between accuracy and computational
efficiency depends on the power system under consideration as well
as the operational practices in use. The structure of Block 1 in Fig. 1
may be designed so as to comply with various requirements. For ex-
ample, reference [15] of the paper uses a two-step procedure, where the
first step relies on the classical power system modeling together with a
tailor-made ultra-fast transient stability program. Obviously, such mod-
eling and programs, which are found to give sound-though approxi-
mate-assessment for the system simulated in [15], would be unaccept-
able for other power systems (e.g., for the Hydro-Québec one). How-
ever, this tradeoff between accuracy and computing performances is
not necessarily a real issue. Indeed, contingency filtering is an easily
parallelizable process, where computations distributed among, say, “c”
computers divide the computing time by almost c; this may allow one to
consider as many contingencies as deemed a priori interesting without
sacrificing to accuracy.
2) We also agree that we could use an adaptive OMIB model to
exploit its predictive capabilities, thus speeding up the computations.
This may be achieved via the 2-machine equivalent proposed in [1] or
via the OMIB derived in the context of the Emergency SIME discussed
in 6).
3) Admittedly, in order to discard first-swing stable contingencies
one could think of “pure” time-domain simulations without using
SIME, thus making it easier to implement. However, an advantage
of SIME is that for first-swing unstable contingencies it provides a
stability margin which can be extrapolated (or interpolated) with the
margin provided by the “ranking-assessment block” (Block 2 in Fig. 1)
in order to identify potentially harmful and harmless contingencies
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and further to rank them within each class. In addition, SIME’s
stability/instability conditions provide early termination reliable and
objective criteria for performing time-domain simulations only during
a (usually) very short time period. Finally, observe that avoiding SIME
in the first block does not make implementation that much easier,
since it is anyhow used in the second block.
To summarize the above discussion, the first block of FILTRA may
be designed in a large variety of ways, including statistical (e.g., pat-
tern recognition) techniques, as well as deterministic ones; and among
the deterministic approaches, pure time-domain techniques as well.
The point is, however, that the FILTRA software aims at achieving
a unified approach to contingency filtering, ranking and assessment,
i.e., much more than a mere first-swing stable/unstable assessment.
Actually, in addition to filtering contingencies, FILTRA ranks multi-
swing stable/unstable contingencies and assesses the multiswing un-
stable ones in terms of margins and critical machines; it thus paves the
way toward systematic and near-optimal control, i.e., stabilization pro-
cedures [see 6)].
4) You are right, contingencies declared to be “stable” and dis-
carded in the first block are considered to be multiswing stable for a
clearing time of 95 ms simulated during the maximum integration pe-
riod.
5) With reference to your question about cases for which the “tra-
ditional margin,” expressed by (A.1), p. 442, does not exist, we, indeed,
use the “time to instability” as a handy severity indicator for ranking
contingencies. Another indicator could of course be the ISGA that you
propose.
Note that in the absence of the traditional margin, the time to insta-
bility is defined as the time where the “distance” between the Pe and
the Pm curves reaches a minimum, i.e., when Pa > 0, _Pa > 0 (see
[1] and [16]). Thus, the time to instability is defined on the basis of ob-
jective criteria, similar to those used when a traditional margin exists.
On the other hand, declaring loss of synchronism when the angle dif-
ference between any two generators exceeds 360, as you suggest, is a
pragmatic criterion, largely depending on the specifics of the power
system; for other systems, this angular difference could be 180; it
could be combined or not with a criterion involving generators’ speed.
6) The potential benefits of using the information provided by
FILTRA (margins and critical machines) for preventive control are
shortly sketched in Section III-D (pp. 440–441) of the paper, where
this information yields techniques able to stabilize unstable contin-
gencies, considered separately or simultaneously. The paper addresses
generation shifting techniques, although load shedding could also be
considered. Note that the derived countermeasures are near-optimal
with respect to the amount of generation to shift and the choice of
generators involved. Nevertheless, no matter how optimal the resulting
control actions, it is questionable whether the operator would decide
to trigger them, unless the occurrence of a contingency is imminent.
An alternative to the preventive control actions suggested by the
above “Preventive SIME” is the use of remedial control actions, as
you point out. This question is addressed by the “Emergency SIME”
(ES). A main difference with the “Preventive SIME” is that ES relies
on real-time phasor measurements that it uses in order to:
1) predict whether the resulting OMIB is driven to instability;
2) if yes, to assess how unstable the system is going to be (in terms
of the corresponding margin) and when (“time to instability”);
3) assess how much generation to shed and from which generating
plant(s), in order to stabilize the case;
4) continue monitoring the system to assess whether the control ac-
tion already triggered in sufficient or more generation should be
shed.
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This four-step procedure yields a closed-loop control which, with
modern technology facilities, takes about 350 to 450 ms [16]. Note
that the contingency which actually has occurred is not supposed to
be known; only its effects are reflected through the incoming mea-
surements. In addition, ES is also free from modeling and parameters
uncertainties.
The ES has been simulated on real-world power systems to protect
dedicated power plants: Churchill falls of the Hydro-Québec power
system [1], Itaipú in the Brazilian South–Southeast power system [2],
and the WSCC system [3]. It has always worked successfully, provided
that the time to instability exceeds 350 to 400 ms. And although further
improvements are still needed, ES shows to be an effective approach to
closed-loop transient stability emergency control.
7) Finally, we seize the opportunity of this discussion to mention
that in the right-hand column of p. 439, Fig. 3 has mistakenly been
referred to as Fig. 1(a).
We thank again Dr. Rovnyak for pointing out interesting aspects of
our work. Also, we would like to express our appreciation to the re-
viewers for their valuable suggestions.
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Discussion of “Gaming and Price Spikes in Electric Power
Markets”1
Deb Chattopadhyay
Deb Chattopadhyay (Charles River Associates, New Zealand): I
would like to commend the authors for presenting a simple and trans-
parent exposure to a complex subject. The analytic framework provides
an interesting premise that could very well be extended potentially in
many directions including transmission, reserve, entry decisions, etc.
However, the following two are of particular interest to me given the el-
egant economic theories that already exist, but have not been exploited
to my knowledge in the context of electricity markets.
8) Issue of Uncertainty: Although this issue has been alluded to in
the paper, it would be interesting, for example, to formally an-
alyze how the noncooperative game solution is affected by var-
ious uncertainties that directly or indirectly affect the pay-offs.
In fact, one can perhaps argue at one extreme that uncertainty it-
self explains the random price spikes in the presence of a steep
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supply curve. Although, an extension of the prisoner’s dilemma
to explicitly take into account the impact of temperature, gener-
ator outage, etc., would reveal some useful insight, rather than
picking such an extreme case.
9) Information Asymmetry: The other area, albeit more theoretical,
is to consider the specific information content of the genera-
tors. Put differently, the current analysis implicitly assumes all
the generators effectively have same information content. This
is more often untrue—at least the presence of long term con-
tracts, and possibly a lot more information is available to gen-
erators to be able to make a call on withdrawing capacity in a
particular hour, e.g., generators may offer a portion of capacity
at extremely high price when certain units of its competitor are
on planned/forced outage aggravating an already tight situation.
The presence of vesting contract for certain generators is another
example—depending on the nature of the contract, a generator
may be more or less indifferent to price spikes leaving others to
take advantage of the situation.
Incidentally, I did not follow why the following comment is made in
the paper “As we explain, this gaming behavior can take place inde-
pendently of market power …” I would think that strategic withholding
of capacity to raise prices above competitive level is a sure sign of
market power. It seems the generators in California (and typically in
most markets elsewhere) do possess such market power, and the issue
really is whether they actually exercise such power, or whether the sub-
ject price spikes, in fact, occurred due to genuine capacity shortages.
It may not be out of context to repeat that price spikes are not neces-
sarily bad things because they may signal need for future investments
in peaking generation capacity, transmission, or DSM, which indeed is
a major purpose of spot prices. A steep supply curve could very well be
indicative of new peaking entry opportunities, but I believe the (some-
what tenuous) argument in Section V is that it was in fact indicative
of strategic withholding—again this is yet another area where further
elaboration by the authors would be appreciated.
Xiaohong Guan (Xian Jiaotong University, China), Yu-Chi Ho
and Dave Pepyne (Harvard University, USA): The authors appre-
ciate the discusser’s interests in our paper and many valuable com-
ments. We have the following remarks regarding the discusser’s ques-
tions and comments.
1) Uncertain factors including loads, temperature, etc., would cause
the bidders to guess and game. This is the main idea of the paper.
This kind of gaming behavior is so called opportunistic collusion
and may not be persistent. It is often caused uncertain externali-
ties, e.g., the outage of one or more units, as the discusser men-
tioned. Although in our paper, we gave a theoretical threshold to
switch bidding strategies based on the subjective probability that
the bidders believe. However, it is very hard to know the other
bidders’ profits in Table I. Therefore (13) is only theoretically
meaningful. The quantitative influence of uncertainties on bidding
strategies is our work of the next step.
2) We agree the information asymmetry may give some bidders ad-
vantages so that some may game more often than others, espe-
cially when they have market power. However, the gaming be-
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